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COMMENT: FEDERALISM AND TWO
CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTS
CHRISTOPHER]. PETERSt

Does the American system of federalism advance or retard the
protection of individual rights? The question cannot be answered
satisfactorily without determining, in advance, which rights are
worth protecting.
Imagine two different conceptions of individual rights. On the
first conception, which I will refer to as the public conception, the
individual rights that matter most are rights against the government:
rights such as freedom of speech, press, and religion, due process
and equal protection of the laws, freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and so on. These are the rights codified in the
American Bill of Rights, broadly construed to include the first eight
amendments to the Constitution as well as the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth.1
On the second conception of individual rights, which I will call
the private conception, the rights that matter most are rights against
other private individuals (or groups of private individuals, such as
corporations). Such rights include the rights to be free from bodily
assault, from theft of property, from forcible labor, and perhaps
others. With the notable exception of the Thirteenth Amendment,2
these kinds of rights seem to find no overt expression in the federal
Constitution.
I want to suggest in this brief Comment that one's views on the
tAssistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A.,
1989, Amherst College; J.D., 1992, University of Michigan Law School. I would
like to thank the following people for their efforts in making this Symposium
possible: Dean Joan Mahoney; Associate Dean Frederica Lombard; Assistant
Dean James Robb, Deborah Mcfarland, Kristine Herzog, and the rest of the
Development Office staff; Coco Siewert; Betty Maltz; the editorial board and
staff of The Wayne Law Review; fellow members of the faculty Programs &
Awards Committee; and participants in both Symposium panels.
1. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-VIII, XIV, XV.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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relationship between federalism and individual rights depend to a
very great extent on which of these conceptions one prefers. The
different consequences of choosing each conception over the other
have been nicely demonstrated i?y two of the presentations made
this afternoon, those of Professor Hamilton and Professor Waits.3
I will focus on them, although I believe the distinction between the
two" conceptions also underlies much of what Professor
Chemerinsky has said in his critique of the Supreme Court's
federalism jurisprudence.
Let me begin with the paper presented by Professor Waits. In
Professor Waits's view, the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Morrison4 retards individual rights by making it more
difficult for women like Christy Brzonkala to redress acts of
gender-based violence carried out against them. By means of the
Violence Against Women Act,S Congress had sought to vindicate
the rights of women to be free from such violence. In Morrison,
however, the Court interposed federalism as an obstacle to this
vindication. Norms of federalism, then-at least as interpreted by
the Morrison Court - had the effect of hindering rather than
promoting the protection of rights. (professor Chemerinsky also
takes this view of Morrison.)
Note that Professor Waits implicitly adopts the second, private
conception of rights I described earlier. In assessing the value of
federalism, her chief concern is for rights individuals have against"
other private parties, such as the right to be free from gender-based
violence. By this standard of rights, federalism does not seem to fare
very well, at least in the Morrison case. Far from facilitating the
protection of private rights, federalism was applied in Morrison to
actively frustrate that protection by disabling the institution most
willing to provide it-the federal government. Federalism, that is,
became a sword against rights rather than a shield around them.
Contrast Professor Waits's private conception of rights with
3. Professor Kathleen Waits made a presentation attbe Symposium, however
she was unable to submit her article to this Wayne Law Review issue.
4. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2001).
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Professor Hamilton's public conception. For Professor Hamilton,
federalism is a safeguard, or a collection of safeguards, against the
overextension of government~s power to coerce individuals.
Professor Hamilton implicitly recognizes that most legislation
restricts individual freedom by its very nature; even legislation
designed to protect the rights of some people risks infringing the
rights of others. The classic example is the criminal law, which risks
punishing innocent parties to protect the rights of the community.
In the context of the Violence Against Women Act, a strict civil
libertarian might worry that providing civil remedies or criminal
penalties for violence "motivated by" gender goes beyond merely
assigning consequences to actions and impairs the individual's rights
to think and to speak, however offensive that thought or speech
might be to others. The costs to individual rights imposed by such
a statute might outstrip the benefits provided by it. On this view,
by placing obstacles in the path of broad national legislation, a
system of dual sovereignty diminishes both the risk and the cost of
legislation that produces a net detriment to individual rights.
Professor Hamilton's unspoken adoption of a public conception
of individual rights, and Professor Waits's adoption of a private
conception, produce interesting implications for their respective
methodologies. Professor Hamilton's defense of federalism is built
upon a big-picture view of the relationship between the national
and the state governments; for her, federalism is not so much a
question of how to allocate power in particular cases, or over
particular subjects, as it is a question of how to maintain an
enduring balance of power between the two levels of government.
As such, Professor Hamilton's methodology is one of institutional
theory, of predicting the long-term consequences of particular
decisions on the overall allocation of sovereignty and thus on the
tension between sovereignty and individual rights.
Professor Waits's methodology could hardly be more different.
She takes a narrative or "storytelling" approach, which she readily
acknowledges is intended to focus our attention on the impact that
seemingly abstract decisions of doctrine can have on real
people-on the implications of federalism for particular individuals
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in panicular cases. Her methodology thus is particularized and
experiential rather than generalized and theoretical.
This contrast in methodologies, I think, is closely connected to
the contrast in substantive conceptions of rights I described a
moment ago. A public conception of rights is not very well
supported by a case-specific, experiential methodology, for two
related reasons. First, there are so many variables affecting
government's respect for individual rights that it is difficult or
impossible to tell, in any given case, how particular rights are
affected by a certain allocation of power between the state and
federal governments. Second, in cases where individual rights
clearly have been violated by government, courts find remedies in
the substantive rights provisions of the Constitution rather than in
its structural provisions. When the federal government burdens free
speech, for instance, a court will decide the case pursuant to the
First Amendment, not the Commerce Clause. Someone looking for
a connection between federalism and the protection of rights, then,
must focus rather abstractly on large questions of institutional
structure rather than on particular cases.
A private conception of rights, however, lends itself nicely to
case-specific and even emotive analysis, because it suffers from
neither of these data collection problems. Usually it is relatively
simple to isolate a connection between private individual rights and
legislation designed to protect them. The federal Violence Against
Women Act, for instance, clearly vindicated the right to be free
from gender-based violence. And cases involving private rights are
virtually never decided pursuant to the substantive rights provisions
of the Constitution, because those provisions, with the rarely
invoked exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, do not apply to
private conduct. Thus it normally is not difficult to trace a
particular effect on private rights to a particular allocation of federal
and state power. In Morrison, for example, a decision upholding
Congress' authority to create the Violence Against Women Act
would have promoted individual rights by preserving the Act's
protections against gender-based violence, while the Court's actual
decision to limit Congress' authority impaired individual rights by
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destroying those protections.
It therefore appears that those who prefer a private conception
of rights, as Professor Waits does, can assess the connection
between rights and federalism by looking to specific instances
involving specific policies and specific people. Those who prefer a
public conception of rights, like Professor Hamilton, must be
content with more abstract arguments of theory. The result is to
give the proponents of private rights something of a rhetorical
advantage. 6
In my view, however, neither methodology is sufficient by
itself; nor is either substantive conception of individual rights
complete without the other. Let me begin with the substantive
conceptions. To envision federalism as primarily about protecting
individual rights from public impairment is, to borrow a metaphor
from Calvin Massey, to see its yin without appreciating its yang.7
Federalism is about empowering government, not just about
limiting it-a point Professor Chemerinsky makes quite effectively
in his contribution to this Symposium. The Constitution was, after
all, a fundamental departure from the status quo under the Articles
of Confederation, in which the national government wielded
almost no sovereign authority. A reading of federalism as
principally a source of limitation on national sovereignty ignores
the transformative impact of that departure; it elides the fact that
the Constitution greatly enlarged the power of the national
government.
To be sure, the Framers, in speaking of individual rights, often
voiced the concern that individual rights would be trampled by the
public. Thus Madison in Federalist No. 10 fretted about the danger

6. Perhaps not, however, in the legal academy, which often appears more
receptive to bloodless, abstract accounts than with uncomfortable stories about
real people.
7. See Caivin Massey, TheTaoojFederalism,20HARV.J.L.&PUB.POL'Y887
(1997).
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to "the rights of ... citizens,,8 posed by majority factions,9 and
Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 justified an independent judiciary as
a shield for individual and minority rights. 10 But the Framers also
understood that protection of the individual's rights against other
private parties was what justified having government in the first
place. This was the import of Madison's famous dictum in Federalist
No. 51 that "[i]f men were angels, no government would be
necessary.,,11 The Framers, after all, had read Hobbes and Locke,
both of whom saw in government an essential remedy for private
violence. 12
The Constitution, then, is aimed both at limiting government
and at empowering it; it is aimed both at preserving public rights
and at protecting private ones. The federalism provisions of that
Constitution, as parts of the Constitution, must be read in this
spirit. The sovereignty granted the national government by the
Constitution is not infinitely broad, but it is (nearly) infinitely
deep; as the Court held in McCulloch v. Maryland,13 Congress has
the power to employ "all means which are appropriate" to the
limited ends that are set for it. 14 And one of the ends of federal
power, one of the most important ones, must be the defense-and
indeed the advancement-of individual rights. This truism arises
from the very fact of the Constitution itself, which transformed an
alliance of independent states into a unified nation under the head

a

8. THE FEDERAUST No. 10, at 123 ames Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
9. See id. at 122-28.
10. See THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 436-42 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1987).
11. See THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 319 Games Madison) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987).
.
12. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 223-28 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Penguin Books 1968) (1651);]OHNLOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT
305,323,366-69,374-77,395-99,401-09 (peter Lasletted., Cambridge Univ.Press
1963) (1690).
13. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
14. [d. at 420 (emphasis added). Violation of specific rights guaranteed in the
Constitution, of course, would not be an "appropriate" means.
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of a powerful and potentially energetic central government.15 The
truism is confirmed by the Reconstruction Amendments,
particularly by the clause of each amendment that allows Congress
to enforce its commands "by appropriate legislation.,,16 To interpret
federalism norms solely according to a public conception of rights
is to undervalue or ignore the extent to which the private
conception is deeply embedded in the fabric of our constitutional
structure.
Now to methodology. Which approach is most appropriate to
assessing the relationship between federalism and individual rights:
Professor Hamilton's broad structural approach, animated by
rather abstract theory, or Professor Waits's case-specific approach,
animated by experience and even emotion? The answer in my view
is that each approach is best when played against the other.
On the one hand, assessing federalism on a caSe-by-case basis,
with the focus solely on the effects of the particular regulation
being challenged, is penny-wise but pound-foolish. Concern for
integrity of process must on occasion trump anxiety about
particular results, even horrible ones. This is because process can
itself protect individual rights, a fact we implicitly acknowledge
when, for instance, we require prosecutors to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt and plaintiffs to prove liability by a
preponderance of the evidence. Federalism belongs to this same
family of procedural safeguards; and so, as Professor Hamilton
demonstrates, its very point is lost when we weaken or ignore its
requirements for the sake of achieving satisfying results in
particular cases.
At the same time, we must continually reassess whether the
15. Cf. THE FEDERAUST No. 26, at 196 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac
Kramnick eel. 1987), in which Hamilton, defends the proposed grant of power
to Congress to appropriate money "[t]o raise and support armies," see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 12, notes the failure of the Articles of Confederation to
"stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER
and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of
private rights."
16. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, § 2, XIV, § 5, XV, § 2.
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supposed safeguards of federalism really work as promised. This is
where Professor Waits's evocative technique of storytelling
becomes especially valuable: it reminds us that the connection
between federalism and individual rights cannot be taken for
granted. The case of Christy Brzonkala suggests that dual
sovereignty sometimes harms individual rights more than it helps
them, because it sometimes gets in the way of innovative federal
legislation designed to protect rights from private encroachment. If
we begin to see enough examples like this, we might conclude that
the costs to individual rights imposed by the Court's heightened
enforcement of federalism outweigh its benefits. Indeed, one could
make a respectable case that we have seen plenty of examples like
this already-that since the Civil War, federalism has served far
more often as an obstacle to the protection of rights than as a
facilitator of that protection. (professor Chemerinsky's
contribution here goes a long way toward making precisely this
case.)
Perhaps, then, courts should use the drama of particular cases
like United States v. Morrison 17 not as a reason to override the
safeguards of federalism, but as a reason to question the efficacy, or
at least the application, of those safeguards. And perhaps that
process of questioning should proceed on the assumption that
private rights-those we have with respect to our fellow
citizens-are as worthy of protection as the rights we have with
respect to our government.

17. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).

